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Abstract
We analyze the design of incentive mechanisms for the provision of transnational public goods
under asymmetric information. Transnational public goods are infrastructures that no single country
can afford to build for itself. We show that the external constraints imposed by this mechanism may
affect consumption, pricing and the true redistributive concerns of local governments. We
characterize the corresponding distortions. We also discuss the impact of the preferences for
redistribution of the international agency in charge of designing the mechanism and the role of its
ability to enforce that mechanism.
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1. Introduction
It is well recognized by now, both among practitioners and scholars, that proper
infrastructures are key to economic development. Several empirical studies illustrate the
impact of infrastructures on economic growth.1 A 1% increase in the stock of infra-0047-2727/$ - see front matter D 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1 See for the case of Latin America, Calderon et al. (2002) and Calderon and Serven (2002) among
others.
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developed countries suffer significant shortages in accessing to crucial infrastructures.
For instance, the stock and quality levels of infrastructures in Latin America and
Caribbean countries has lost significant ground relative to East Asia and OECD countries.
To illustrate that point, Calderon and Serven (2002) show that, from 1980 to 1997, the
Latin America infrastructure gap relative to East Asia grew by 40% for roads, 70% for
telecommunications and nearly 90% for power generation. These authors argue that this
widening infrastructure gap can account for nearly 25% of the Latin America’s GDP
output gap relative to the East Asian economies over the 1980–2000 period.
In response to this issue, and given the scarcity of public funds in LDCs,2 most
developing countries have turned to the foreign private sector for financing and operating
infrastructures. However, a number of difficulties have emerged from this strategy. First,
some countries have failed to attract foreign investments. Second, even those who
succeeded have sometimes faced a high rate of renegotiation for these contracts.3 Initiated
by governments or concessionnaries, renegotiation has often created public opposition to
what is sometimes presented, for water concessions in particular, as a loss of sovereignty.
Whatever the strength of the motivations behind these public positions, alternative
ways of financing infrastructures should be looked for. How to reconcile the need for more
investment in public infrastructures and the aspiration of LDCs for a close control of their
public services is a major political question today.
Cooperation among small LDCs, such as those of Central America or of the
Mediteranean Rim, might be a potential solution. Sometimes the least-cost approach to
improving the supply of infrastructure services requires cross-country integration of
networks or shared access to a common resource. This is certainly the case for
infrastructure projects that arise out of the growth of commerce and trade. Examples
include road and rail networks, power grids4 and telecommunication networks. This is also
the case for projects which are less commercially driven such that investments in
environmental protection and the management of shared resources such as water.5 This
paper develops a theoretical framework to explore the allocative and distributive
consequences of those transnational coordinations.
Infrastructures often entail fixed costs which are so large that no single country can
afford to build the infrastructure alone. Those fixed costs must be shared by several3 See Guasch et al. (2002).
4 A typical example of such a joint project is the Itaipu hydroelectricity power plant on the Brazil–Paraguay
border. To give an idea of the scale of such a project, that dam corresponds to 25% of energy supply in Brasil and
78% in Paraguay.
5 Both kinds of transnational projects have recently been successfully implemented. Power links are already
in place between Jordan and Syria, and between Syria and Lebanon. Plans have been developed to include Israel,
the West Bank and Gaza but also other SubSaharan countries. An example of the second kind is given by the
Marine Pollution Management Project developed by southwestern Mediterranean countries to enhance the
capacity of countries like Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Lybia and Egypt to deal with marine pollution.
2 A recent report by theWorld Bank mentioned ‘‘When times are hard, capital spending on infrastructure is the
first item to go. . . Despite the long-term economics costs of slashing infrastructure spending, governments find it
less politically costly than reducing public employment or wages.’’ World Development Report (1994, p. 19).
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mechanism must be agreed upon by partners involved in the project. This perspective
raises of course the ugly head of the free-rider problem which arises when an efficient
Coasian bargaining fails. Such inefficiencies are particularly relevant in contexts plagued
by informational asymmetries.
A general lesson from the literature on public good mechanisms developed over the last
30 years is that, under asymmetric information, the optimal mechanism may require some
deviations away from the first-best. In our context, a country may pretend having a low
willingness to pay for the public good to minimize its own contribution and let partners
bear the bulk of investment. To curb those incentives, the project should be sometimes
given up even though it would have been optimal to build it under complete information.
This important insight has been so far derived by looking at the provision of a public
good for individual agents, not for countries. Countries can only be reduced to individual
agents under the very restrictive assumption that all inhabitants are the same. Agents are in
fact heterogeneous and may differ with respect to their wealth or their willingness to pay
for the public good. Individual preferences are only aggregated through some political
process. Politics determines the weights of the various types of agents in the objective
functions of the governments involved in bargaining over the collective decision to build
or not the common infrastructure.
In this paper, we argue that the most convenient framework to fully assess the allocative
and distributive consequences of transnational public good mechanisms should make
explicit this distinction between countries and individuals. The theoretical framework
should account for two distinct layers of contracting and allow for a nested information
structure. The first layer concerns the countries (or more precisely their governments)
involved in bargaining. Countries are privately informed on the aggregate expected
welfare they get from building the infrastructure and tend to minimize their respective
contributions. The second layer deals with the fact that, within each country, agents have
private information on the individual benefits they derive from the infrastructure. Optimal
pricing of the service is then constrained by this added asymmetric information. The
redistributive concerns of the governments affect pricing and may create a wedge between
price and marginal cost to redistribute wealth across various groups.
With transnational projects, each country is externally constrained by the rules of the
mechanism for collective choice. A collective solution to the bargaining problem, maybe
designed under the aegis of an international agency (thereafter IA), defines each country’s
financial contribution to the common project and, whether it should be built or not.
Different degrees of enforcement of these transnational mechanisms impose various
external constraints on the redistributive concerns at the local level. The prices charged
to consumers for using the infrastructure may then result from a compromise between these
external constraints and the redistributive concerns of the governments. As a result, there is
little hope to see transnational infrastructures being priced as simple ‘‘local public goods’’
which would have been self-financed by each country alone. To make the international
negotiation easier, pricing policies in the different countries involved may be deeply
intertwined. This paper precisely analyzes these distributive and allocative issues.
To set up the stage, we assume that an IA is in charge of raising contributions from
two countries interested in building a transnational infrastructure and proposes a
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contributions and the probability of building or not the infrastructure. Countries are made
of heterogeneous agents with different preferences for the public good. At the aggregate
level, countries may differ with respect to their preferences for redistribution and have
private information on those preferences. Different levels of enforcement of the
mechanism are analyzed.
In the most comprehensive contracting environment, the IA can suggest the prices
charged to consumers and acceptance of the mechanism by each country is mandatory.
The optimal mechanism which maximizes the sum of expected welfares in both countries
selects the efficient6 decision to build or not the infrastructure and induces pricing schemes
in each country which depend only on its own redistributive concerns.
The drawback of such an efficient mechanism is that incentive compatibility at the
countries’ level might be obtained by leaving the countries the most eager to redistribute
with a negative level of expected welfare. When the possibility of opting out of the
mechanism is taken into account, a country’s incentives to report truthfully its preferences
for redistribution may conflict with the exercise of those sovereign rights. The contribution
to the collective project of a country that is eager to redistribute must be reduced. The
project can no longer be performed as often as if the countries’ preferences were common
knowledge. Under weak conditions, pricing schemes in both countries are now inter-
twined. Asymmetric information between countries exacerbate redistributive concerns of
the local governments and reinforce the conflict due to asymmetric information within the
countries.
Contrary to standard public good problems where pricing and decision to build or not
the infrastructure are jointly determined, the nested structure of our model suggests that the
IA may not have the full control of the prices charged within each country. Instead, pricing
may be still decided by governments if they cannot commit to relinquish these rights to the
IA. The only remaining tool available to the IA for screening purposes is then the
probability of building the project. De facto, pricing in one country is independent of
pricing in the other and obeys only to the local redistributive concerns. However, the
probability of cancelling the project must be increased since this is now the only way that
countries can be screened apart. Inefficiencies in bargaining are then more severe.
Finally, we also analyze the case where the IA has also some redistributive concerns
and wants to promote either the welfare of poor countries as a whole, or at a more
disaggregated level, the welfare of poor individuals within countries. Those concerns for
redistribution reinforce inefficiencies. Far from helping countries in promoting the well-
being of the poorest agents, those concerns may force to cancel international projects more
often and to distort consumption even more.
Our paper lies at the intersection of two different trends of the literature: on the one
hand, the traditional analysis of public good mechanisms under informational con-
straints; on the other hand, the recent and growing game theoretic literature on
transnational public goods. Following Groves (1973), the seventies have witnessed
important innovations in the design of collective decision mechanisms to mitigate the6 In a sense to be defined below.
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implementing the first-best production of public goods. Green and Laffont (1977b) and
Walker (1980) showed that no such mechanism exists which is budget-balanced.
D’Aspremont and Grard-Varet (1979) and Arrow (1979) showed that, by weakening
the equilibrium concept from dominant strategy to Bayesian–Nash, budget-balance can
be achieved. However, Laffont and Maskin (1979) proved that it was often impossible
to satisfy also interim individual rationality constraints. Only more recently, some
authors have turned to the second-best problem of designing a collective decision
mechanism which maximizes expected social welfare under incentive, participation and
budget-balanced constraints. The main contributions along those lines are due to
Ledyard and Palfrey (1999), Rob (1989) and Mailath and Postlewaite (1990). These
papers are concerned with individual agents and have not developed the hierarchical and
nested information structure that is necessary to fully understand the redistributive and
allocative consequences of transnational public goods. On the other hand, transnational
(or more generally global) public goods have been analyzed in game theoretic environ-
ments by Arce and Sandler (2002) and Sandler (1998, 2001). The focus of this literature
is on the role of IAs as mediators who provide communication devices, expanding from
Nash to correlated set of equilibria of contribution games. We borrow from this
literature the idea that IAs play a fundamental role in designing collective mechanisms
but we put at the core of the analysis the informational constraints that those IAs face in
doing so.
Section 2 describes the model. In Section 3, we derive the important benchmark where
the preferences for redistribution in both countries are common knowledge. Asymmetric
information on those preferences is introduced in Section 4. Participation constraints of
the countries are taken into account in Section 5, which is central to the paper. In Section
6, we investigate what happens when countries keep control of the pricing schemes. The
consequences of having an IA with some redistributive concerns are analyzed in Section
7. Section 8 summarizes our main findings and discusses some extensions of the basic
model. Proofs are relegated in the Appendices.2. The model
2.1. Preferences and technology
We consider two countries Ci (i = 1,2) with their respective governments Gi. Those
countries want to build a common infrastructure. Examples of such infrastructures are a
common transportation or telecommunication network, a common power grid, a common
nuclear or hydroelectricity plant. Each country is unable to finance alone such a large-scale
project whose cost is F. Both countries have thus to contribute to the financing of a public
good which has a 0–1 nature: building or not the infrastructure.77 Note that there is no alternative to the common infrastructure. The next-best infrastructure gives zero payoff
to each agent. This assumption simplifies significantly the analysis.
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different preferences for the private use of the infrastructure. Their utility function over the
quantity x of private consumption8 and the corresponding payment made t is:
U ¼ hvðxÞ  t; ð1Þ
where v(S) is increasing and concave with the Inada conditions being satisfied (vV>0, vU < 0,
vV(0) = +l, vV( +l) = 0). Introducing the private use of the infrastructure is required to
understand how pricing within each country is affected by the external constraints imposed
by the collective decision mechanism.
The parameter h represents the intensity of an agent’s preferences. For instance, h may
reflect the agent’s wealth. With this interpretation, richer people are also the most eager to
use the infrastructure. h belongs to the set H={h; h¯} (we denote by Dh = h¯ h the spread of
the distribution) with respective probabilities 1 m and m. We will assume that h>(m/1–m)
Dh to always ensure a positive consumption in all the second-best environments described
below.
For further references, it is useful to define the first-best surplus of an agent with type h
consuming x units of services provided by the infrastructure as S(h, x) = hm(x) cxF/2,
where c is the constant marginal cost of using the infrastructure and F/2 is the share of the
fixed cost that should be paid by this agent.9 Of course, efficiency is characterized by the
following first-best consumption x*(h) for an agent with type h:
hvVðx*ðhÞÞ ¼ c: ð2Þ
Gi maximizes a weighted sum of Ci inhabitants’ utilities. Denoting by Ui(h) the utility
of an agent with preferences h, Gi’s objective function is:
aimUiðh¯Þ þ ð1 aimÞUiðhÞ:10
where ai < 1 is a non-negative parameter representing Gi’s preferences for redistribution.
As ai decreases, the concerns for redistribution towards the poor are more pronounced. In
the limiting case where ai= 0, the government is Rawlsian and cares only about the poor
with the smallest utility level. When ai is close to 1, Gi behaves instead as a pure expected
utility maximizer concerned only with efficiency.
To further stress the trade-off between efficiency and redistributive concerns of the
government, it is useful to rewrite this objective function as:
mUiðh¯Þ þ ð1 mÞUiðhÞ  mð1 aiÞðUiðh¯Þ  UiðhÞÞ: ð3Þ8 This consumption can be viewed as the amount of electricity consumed if the infrastructure is a power grid
or a hydroelectricity plant or the number of phone calls for a telecommunication network.
9 For simplicity, we assume that the two symmetric countries share equally the fixed-cost and finance that
amount with lump-sum taxation in a first-best environment.
10 Ledyard and Palfrey (1999) have analyzed such objective functions in the case of a pure public good
produced for a single country. Maximization of this objective under incentive constraints yields an interim
efficient allocation in the sense of Holmstrm and Myerson (1983).
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a¯} (where 0V a< a¯< 1) with respective probabilities 1 q and q. We denote by Da = a¯ a
the spread of this distribution. This can be viewed as a proxy for the maximal degree of
polarization between those countries. For technical reasons, we will assume that a>( q/1–q)
Da so that the virtual preferences for redistribution defined below remain positive.
2.2. Asymmetric information
Asymmetric information plays a role at two levels: within and across countries.
2.2.1. Within each country
Agents cannot be discriminated directly on the basis of their tastes which is their private
information, but only with respect to their individual consumptions. Pricing has to be
incentive compatible and satisfy the self-selection constraints of the different types of
consumers. The government’s concerns for redistribution lead us to define in a rather
standard way11 the virtual surplus S˜(h, x, ai) of an agent with type h consuming x units as
respectively his true first-best surplus if h = h¯ and a modified surplus
S˜ðh; x; aiÞ ¼ h  m
1 m ð1 aiÞDh
 
vðxÞ  cx F
2
when h = h.
Note that the virtual surplus depends explicitly on ai and that it is lower than the first-best
surplus both in absolute terms but also at the margin. If the country with preferences aiwere
able to self-finance the infrastructure, it is these virtual surpluses which would be maximized
for both types of consumers. A poor agent would thus consume a second-best amount:
h  m
1 m ð1 aiÞDh
 
vVðx˜ðh; aiÞÞ ¼ c; ð4Þ
whereas a rich one would still consume the first-best quantity x˜(h¯, ai) = x*(h¯). Note
that S˜(h, x˜(h,a¯),a¯) >S˜(h, x˜(h,a),a) because Da>0.
Within each country, the poor consume less than the first-best. Indeed, ensuring
incentive compatibility for the rich requires such a distortion to compensate for the
redistribution, which is achieved through pricing. A a
¯
-government which is the less
concerned with redistribution distorts less the consumption of the poor. This also implies
that the a¯-country prefers a less egalitarian distribution of utilities than the a-one.
2.2.2. Across countries
The government and the agents within a given country Ci have private information on
ai.
12 That assumption can be motivated on several grounds. First, it may capture the fact that11 See Ledyard and Palfrey (1999) for instance.
12 Assuming that agents know the redistributive concerns of the government simplifies the presentation and
avoids some technicalities associated with solving an informed principal problem which would appear if only Gi
was privately informed on ai. Note nevertheless that this informed principal problem would not be an issue
because we are in a context of private values where the principal’s type does not enter directly into the preferences
of the agent and all utilities are quasi-linear. As in Maskin and Tirole (1990), the same contractual outcome as
under complete information on ai within the country would be obtained.
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For instance, the government of a given country may be more or less biased towards the rich
depending on its degree of corruption or the latter group’s political influence. Second, the
linear specification of the government’s preferences can be viewed as a tractable way of
introducing a trade-off between efficiency and redistribution in a model with quasi-linear
utility functions as argued by Ledyard and Palfrey (1999).13 Asymmetric information on
the preferences for redistribution can thus be viewed as a proxy for asymmetric information
on the budget constraint faced by the country. This seems a highly plausible assumption in
the case of LDCs where inefficiencies in the tax systems or in national accounting
procedures are likely to throw a veil on the budget constraint. With this interpretation of
our model in mind, a government’s incentives to lie on its concerns for redistribution can be
viewed as coming from its incentives to lie on its true budget constraint and thus on how
much it can contribute to the joint project.
For completeness, we provide in Appendix A a simple model which endogenizes
simultaneously our modeling choices of objective functions and asymmetric information.
In this simple model, we show that a benevolent government putting a priori an equal
weight on all different types of agents in its objective function would actually behave as in
Eq. (3) because of asymmetric information on the agents’ tastes. Then ai reflects the
shadow cost of the country’s budget constraint. Private information on budget is thus akin
to private information on ai. In what follows, we will thus assimilate a rich (resp. poor)
country as having preferences for redistribution given by a¯ (resp. a) but our model allows
for alternative interpretations. More generally, a a¯-country is less concerned with
redistribution than a a-one.
2.3. Timing
The timing of the game is as follows. First, agents in each countryCi learn their individual
tastes h. Government Gi and agents in Ci learn also the preferences for redistribution ai.
Second, the IA proposes to both governments a mechanism to finance the common project.
Acceptance can be mandatory or not. Third, both governments choose simultaneously how
much to contribute to the mechanism and which prices they would like to charge to
consumers. Lastly, agents choose their consumption and pay the corresponding price.
2.4. Mechanisms for collective decision
An international agency (IA)14 acts as a third-party offering to both countries a
collective decision mechanism to share the fixed-cost of the infrastructure and14 Like the World Bank and its regional counterparts, the Asian Development Bank, the Inter-American
Development Bank, and the African Development Bank.
13 This tractability is key to embed the model of intra-country redistribution into a transnational context. It
avoids having to handle a true social welfare function defined over the utilities of different types and having to fully
endogenize the shadow cost of public funds. In such a more complete and may be more realistic model, the degree
of inequality aversion of the government generally depends on the budget constraint it faces (see Martimort, 2001
for a model along these lines). When inequality aversion decreases with wealth, a poorer country will have more
incentives to redistribute. A poor (resp. rich) country can thus be viewed as one having a parameter a (resp. a¯).
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IA provides thus an institutional solution to the bargaining problem between the
countries. The IA acts indeed as a ‘‘mediator’’ in the sense of Myerson and
Sattherwaite (1983). It collects contributions, commits to build the infrastructure with
some probability and recommends prices. It does not bring any external funds.15,16
Accordingly, this third-party is a benevolent welfare maximizer putting an equal weight
on each country in its objective function. Had both governments being efficiency
maximizers (ai= 1) the IA would be concerned with ex ante efficiency. Instead, the
existence of redistributive concerns at the local level means that the IA is concerned
with ex ante constrained efficiency where the term constrained should be understood as
capturing those local redistributive concerns only.
Given the two-tier asymmetric information postulated (both on tastes but also on the
countries’ preferences for redistribution), a mechanism stipulates first the probability
p(S) of building the infrastructure and the overall contribution of each country Ti(S) as a
function of the reports aˆ=(aˆ 1,aˆ 2) made by both countries on their preferences for
redistribution. Second, given those reports, the mechanism stipulates also what should
be the price paid ti(S,aˆ) and the consumptions xi(S,aˆ) of each agent in Ci as a function of
his own report hˆ on his taste parameter. A mechanism is thus a vector of functions
{ p(aˆ); Ti(aˆ); ti (hˆ ,aˆ); xi (hˆ ,aˆÞ}. Using the Revelation Principle, there is no loss of
generality in looking for direct mechanisms where truthful reports are optimal
strategies.17
To cover the overall contribution of a given country plus the cost of producing private
services within that country, the prices charged to both types of consumers must satisfy for
any profile a of preferences:
TiðaÞ ¼ pðaÞE
h
ðtiðh; aÞ  cxiðh; aÞÞ: ð5Þ
This expression shows that the contribution of a country to the project is covered by the
prices paid by local consumers. Of course, these prices are only charged conditionally on
the fact that the project is realized.1815 It is easy to introduce some amount of external financing in our framework. If we denote by F’ the fixed-
cost of the project, and by K the amount of external funds provided, our model could account for this extension
provided that F’ –K is now viewed as the fixed-cost of the project.
16 Other roles of the IA could be introduced. Schiff and Winters (2002) stress the role of international
organizations in inducing more cooperative outcomes by fostering trust and providing expertise on state-of-the-art
technology, engineering and financing. Section 7 analyzes the case of an IA with redistributive concerns.
17 Because ai is known by both the government Gi and the residents of Ci, the IA could use a more complex
revelation mechanism eliciting costlessly this commonly known but non-verifiable information (see Maskin,
1999). To rule out those mechanisms, we assume that the IA is unable to communicate directly with individuals.
18 Note that the contribution defined by Eq. (5) is paid upfront, i.e., before the realization of the project or
not. To balance the budget of each government, we must ensure that this contribution is covered by what can be
raised from consumers net of the cost of using the infrastructure. Note also that there is no need to have countries
pay different amounts depending on whether the project is built or not in this context with quasi-linear utility
functions. Only the upfront payment matters for providing incentives to the countries for revealing their
information.
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Given the symmetry of the model, we focus on symmetric mechanisms, omit
indices and sometimes denote overall contributions as T¯= Ti(a¯,a¯ ), Tˆ1 = T1(a¯ , a) = T2(a,
a¯ ), Tˆ2 = T1(a;a¯) = T2(a¯,a) and T = Ti(a,a). The probabilities of building the infrastructure
are also written as p¯ = p(a¯,a¯), pˆ = p(a¯,a) = p(a,a¯) and p = p(a, a). Finally, still for a
symmetric mechanism, we denote consumptions by xi (h,a) = x(h, a). Similar con-
ventions hold for the prices ti(S) and the utilities Ui(S).
The mechanism works as follows. First, countries report their preferences for redistri-
bution, pay a contribution and are offered a menu of possible prices and consumptions for
agents within the country. Second, agents choose within the proposed menus how much
they want to consume and pay the corresponding prices. This implies that their incentive
compatibility constraints are written for a given pair of truthful reports a=(a1, a2).
19
Although, there is a single grand-contract offered by the IA, that mechanism can easily
be interpreted as a nexus of bilateral contracts, one between countries and other ones
within each country defining the pricing scheme. The key thing to notice is that those
contracts are cooperatively designed by the IA, except in Section 6.3. Common knowledge on countries’ preferences
Let us first suppose that the IA has complete information on the countries’ profile of
preferences for redistribution a=(a1, a2).
20
Within each country, the agents’ incentive constraints can thus be expressed in terms of
the utility Ui(h, a) they get and their consumptions xi(h, a). These constraints are
respectively
Uiðh¯; aÞ ¼ pðaÞðh¯vðxiðh¯; aÞÞ  tiðh¯; aÞÞzpðaÞðh¯vðxiðh; aÞÞ  tiðh; aÞÞ
¼ Uiðh; aÞ þ pðaÞDhvðxiðh; aÞÞ: ð6Þ
and
Uiðh; aÞ ¼ pðaÞðhvðxiðh; aÞÞ  tiðh; aÞÞzpðaÞðhvðxiðh¯; aÞÞ  tiðh¯; aÞÞ
¼ Uiðh¯; aÞ  pðaÞDhvðxiðh¯; aÞÞ: ð7Þ
As it is standard in two-type adverse selection models,21 the relevant (binding)
constraint is that of the rich agent h¯, namely Eq. (6), whereas Eq. (7) will be slack at
the optimum as it can be checked ex post on the solution.20 Alternatively, this can be viewed as a setting where the IA uses revelation schemes a¯ la Maskin making
both each government Gi and the inhabitants of Ci report the commonly known piece of information ai.
19 This is akin to a dominant strategy requirement when writing the agents’ incentive constraints.
Alternatively, we could assume that the agents and the countries report simultaneously. Given that an agent in Ci
does not know a i, we would have to focus on Bayesian incentive compatibility constraints. As shown in
Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992), there is nevertheless no loss of generality in focusing on dominant strategy
implementation as long as the decision rule is monotonic, a property which holds in the sequel.
21 See Laffont and Martimort (2002, Chap. 2).
J.-J. Laffont, D. Martimort / Journal of Public Economics 89 (2005) 159–196 169Contributions must cover the (expected) cost of building the project under any profile
of preferences:
X2
i¼1
TiðaÞzpðaÞF: ð8Þ
We rewrite this constraint using Eq. (5) and the definitions of Ui(h, a) given above as:X2
i¼1
pðaÞE
h
ðSðh; xiðh; aÞÞ  Uiðh; aÞ
 
z0: ð9Þ
Intuitively, the sum of expected surpluses in both countries computed for the
consumption profile xi(h,a) must equal the sum of utilities redistributed within each
country.
Being given the preferences profile a, the IA solves the following problem:
ðTPÞFB : max
fpðÞ;UiðÞ;xiðÞ;V˜iðÞg
X2
i¼1
V˜iðaÞ;
subject to Eqs. (6), (7) and (9) and
V˜iðaÞ ¼ aimUiðh¯; aÞ þ ð1 aimÞUiðh; aÞ: ð10Þ
In Appendix A, we show that solving (TP)FB amounts in fact to solving the following
simpler problem:
ðTPÞFB* : max
fpðÞ; xiðÞg
pðaÞ
X2
i¼1
E
h
ðS˜ðh; xiðh; aÞ; aiÞÞ
( )
:
This simple objective aggregates the rich agents’ incentive constraint (6) and the
budget-balanced constraint (9) to get a more compact expression which depends only on
the probability of building the project and the consumption profiles conditionally on its
realization. A first trivial observation is that the IA uses together these two tools to
maximize the sum of expected welfares in both countries.
Because governments in both countries have some redistributive concerns, the IA
considers in fact the sum of expected virtual surpluses in both countries and not the sum of
their true surpluses as an objective. To focus on the most interesting case from an
economic point of view, we assume that the following conditions hold:
E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; a¯Þ; a¯ÞÞ þ E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; aÞ; aÞÞ > 0; ðH1Þ
E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; aÞ; aÞÞ < 0: ðH2Þ
These conditions establish that the infrastructure must be built as soon as at least one
of the countries is not too much concerned by poverty. They define in fact the
constrained efficient probabilities of realizing the project, i.e., the optimal probabilities
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account the consumers’ incentive constraints. (H1) and (H2) also imply that the decision
of building or not the infrastructure is conditional on the exact profile of preferences for
redistribution. A precise knowledge of those preferences is needed to fine-tune the
policy of the IA. This fine-tuning will be the source of some problems under
asymmetric information on the ais. Clearly, if it was optimal to do the project whatever
the countries’ preferences, asymmetric information on those preferences would not be an
issue. It would be enough to have both countries paying the same amount (something
less or equal to the expected virtual surplus of the a-one) to get enough cash to finance
the project.
Proposition 1 summarizes the optimal mechanism offered by the benevolent IA.
Proposition 1. Assume that the preferences profile a is common knowledge and that
conditions (H1) and (H2) both hold. Then, the optimal mechanism for collective decision
is characterized as follows.
	 The decision to build or not the infrastructure is constrained efficient. Probabilities of
building the infrastructure are given by p¯*= pˆ*= 1 and p*= 0.
	 The rich agents’ incentive constraint (6) is binding as soon as the project is done.
	 The rich agents consume always the first-best amount x*(h¯), whereas the poor agents
in Ci consume the second-best quantity x˜(h,ai ) as soon as the project is built.
	 Pricing in any country depends only on the local redistributive concerns.
Of course, the redistributive concerns of each government affect the pricing schemes
suggested by the IA. Even though the IA puts an equal weight on both countries’ welfare,
governments are not efficiency maximizers, and there will remain some distortions in
consumption and pricing away from the first-best. However, there are no more distortions
than those implied by the local preferences for redistribution.
In each country, the rich consume at the first-best level. Instead, consumption is still
downward distorted for the poor and takes the same second-best value as if each country
was able to self-finance the project. Indeed, satisfying the incentive compatibility
constraint (6) requires to give more utility to a h¯-agent than to a h-one. Since governments
are averse to inequality between consumers, doing so is costly. This cost is reduced by
decreasing the consumption of the poor as it can be seen from Eq. (6).22
Since pricing within each country only depends on the local preferences for
redistribution, there is a complete dichotomy between pricing and the decision to build
or not the project which, instead, depends on the preferences for redistribution in both
countries. This dichotomy may be lost under asymmetric information as we will see
below. In that case, there might appear an endogenous link between prices within both
countries. Any departure from the dichotomy result can thus be best understood as
coming from the impossibility for a given country to charge prices in the same way as if22 Of course, a utilitarian government (corresponding to the limiting case a¯ = 1) does not care about the
distribution of utilities within the country. Then, the rich agents’ incentive constraint becomes costless and the
poor consume also the first-best consumption x*(h).
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that a collective agreement imposes on a country do not modify the redistributive
concerns of each country as long as the preferences profile for redistribution is common
knowledge.4. Asymmetric information on countries’ preferences: constrained efficiency
We now consider the case where the IA is uninformed on the ais. To understand
precisely the distortions involved by this added tier of asymmetric information, it is useful
to see the mechanism offered by the IA as specifying the contribution and the distribution
of utility for each country. Letting the governments report their preferences amounts to
having them choose within a menu of possible distributions of utility. This new
formulation is more tractable to express the various constraints of our problem and
illuminates the true nature of the decisions of those governments. In fine, governments are
not really interested in the prices charged to consumers per se but care about the
distribution of utility that those prices induce.
Let us turn to a description of the governments’ Bayesian incentive constraints:
Viða¯Þ ¼ E
ai
E
h
ðUiðh; a¯; aiÞÞ  mð1 a¯ÞðUiðh¯; a¯; aiÞ  Uiðh; a¯; aiÞÞ
 
z E
ai
E
h
ðUiðh; a; a1ÞÞ  mð1 a¯ÞðUiðh¯; a; aiÞ  Uiðh; a; aiÞÞ
 
¼ ViðaÞ þ mDa E
ai
ðUiðh¯; a; aiÞ  Uiðh; a; aiÞÞ: ð11Þ
and
ViðaÞ ¼ E
ai
E
h
ðUiðh; a; aiÞÞ  mð1 aÞðUiðh¯; a; aiÞ  Uiðh; a; aiÞÞ
 
z E
ai
E
h
ðUiðh; a¯; a1ÞÞ  mð1 aÞðUiðh¯; a¯; aiÞ  Uiðh; a¯; aiÞÞ
 
¼ Viða¯Þ  mDa E
ai
ðUiðh¯; a¯; aiÞ  Uiðh; a¯; aiÞÞ: ð12Þ
In what follows, the only relevant (binding) incentive constraint is Eq. (11). It says
that a rich country must be prevented from reporting being poor. By doing so, it indeed
pays a smaller contribution. Furthermore, because of asymmetric information on tastes, a
given level of aggregated welfare can only be implemented by imposing some costly
inequality within the country. A rich country finds it easier to bear such inequality. By
mimicking a poor country, a rich one can thus save on the redistribution costs. The less
egalitarian the distribution of utility in the poor country, the harder it is to satisfy the
incentive constraint (11).
Note also that, when the IA has the strongest ability to enforce the mechanism, the
countries’ participation constraints do not matter. Acceptance of the mechanism is
mandatory.
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of the ais. Using the definition of the Vi(S) and the fact that the IA maximizes now the sum
of expected welfares in both countries, IA’s problem becomes:
ðTPÞ0 : maxfpðÞ; xiðÞ;UiðÞ;ViðÞg
X2
i¼1
E
ai
ðViðaiÞÞ;
subject to (Eqs. (6), (7), (8), (11) and (12)).
We also show in Appendix A that (TP)0 can be expressed in a more compact way as:
23
ðTPÞ0* : maxfpðÞ; xiðÞ;ViðÞgEa pðaÞ
X2
i¼1
E
h
ðS˜ðh; xiðh; aÞ; aiÞÞ
 !( )
subject to Eqs. (11) and (12), and
X2
i¼1
E
ai
ðViðaiÞÞ ¼ E
a
pðaÞ
X2
i¼1
E
h
ðS˜ðh; xiðh; aÞ; aiÞÞ
 !( )
ð13Þ
Proposition 2. Assume that the preferences profile a is private information and that
conditions (H1) and (H2) both hold. Then, the optimal mechanism is constrained efficient. It
entails the same probabilities of building the infrastructure, namely p¯*= pˆ*= 1 and p*= 0
and the same second-best consumption levels as when preferences are common knowledge.
The problem of building the infrastructure can be viewed as a public good problem
along the lines of D’Aspremont and Grard-Varet (1979) and Arrow (1979). The work of
these authors shows that one can design a Bayesian incentive compatible and ex post
budget-balanced mechanism which implements the ex ante efficient outcome. The same
logic applies here. However, there is an added complexity. The mechanism not only
stipulates whether the common infrastructure is built or not but it also defines prices in
both countries. On top of that, the outcome which maximizes the sum of expected welfare
in both countries is not first-best but constrained efficient because of the existing
redistributive concerns of both governments. In an Appendix, we show that there exists
a whole continuum of mechanisms and contributions (which can be indexed by the level of
aggregate welfare in a poor country) which achieve this outcome.24 Given these
contributions, the pricing schemes within each country still give to the agents incentives
to truthfully report their tastes. Again, the distortions for consumption within each country
are totally disentangled from the decision rule on whether to build or not the infrastructure.
The dichotomy between pricing at the local level and the international collective decision
is maintained.23 The expression below no longer contains the contributions made by countries as variables. We show in
Appendix A that, reciprocally, one can find transfers that implement a corresponding allocation of consumptions
and aggregate welfare for each type of country.
24 Among these mechanisms, a focal one might be the so-called pay-the-externality mechanism stressed by
D’Aspremont and Grard-Varet (1979) and Arrow (1979). This mechanism is such that each country pays a
contribution equal to the expected shift in welfare that the other incurs following a change in its own report.
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constraints
Even though the results in proposition seem attractive on normative grounds and
suggest that asymmetric information may not be such an obstacle to investment, the
previous mechanisms suffer from a serious flaw since the countries’ participation
constraints may not be satisfied. In fact, accepting the international agreement is a
sovereign act. To do so, each country must get more than its payoff (that we have
exogenously normalized at zero) without any infrastructure.
Note that the symmetric mechanism which is the solution to (TP)0* defines only the
expected welfare qV(a¯)+(1 q)V(a) of a given country.25 As already stressed, there exists a
whole range of possible values of (V(a), V(a¯)) which satisfy the incentive constraints (11)
and (12) and correspond to the same expected welfare. One may wonder whether, within
this range, there exist some pairs (Vi(a ), Vi(a¯ )) satisfying also the following interim
participation constraints of countries:
Viða¯Þz0; ð14Þ
ViðaÞz0: ð15Þ
In fact, with those participation constraints, constrained efficiency cannot always be
achieved.
Proposition 3. The constrained efficient decision-rule (p¯*,pˆ*, p*) and the second-best
levels of consumption x˜ (h, ai) can no longer be implemented when the countries’
interim participation constraints (14) and (15) must be satisfied if the following
condition holds:
2q2 E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; a¯Þ ; a¯ÞÞ þ 2qð1 qÞ

E

ðS˜ð; x˜ð; a¯Þ; a¯ÞÞ þ E

ðS˜ð; x˜ð; aÞ; aÞÞ

< 2q2mDaDhvð x˜ðh; aÞ Þ : ð16Þ
This condition says that the sovereignty of countries is a source of inefficiency
whenever the aggregated welfare computed for the constrained efficient outcome is
smaller than the cost of inducing information revelation from the a¯ -countries.
Condition (16) is related to an earlier result due to Laffont and Maskin (1979) who
proved that Bayesian incentive compatibility, efficiency, budget balance and individual
rationality may be incompatible, and to Makowski and Mezzetti (1994) and Williams
(1999) characterizations of the individual rationality payoffs which reconcile all those
requirements.
To induce revelation of the country’s preferences, the IA must propose an unequal
distribution of expected welfares across different types of countries. The a¯ -country25 We omit indices because of symmetry.
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maintains an efficient probability of building the infrastructure and sets pˆ* = 1. Indeed, if
the constrained efficient outcome was implemented, Eq. (11) could be written as:
Viða¯ÞzViðaÞ þ mqDaDhvðx˜ðh; aÞÞ for iaf1; 2g: ð17Þ
When pˆ* = 1 and the second-best consumption x˜(h, a) is maintained, the right-hand side of
Eq. (17) is rather large meaning that Vi(a) must be significantly lower than Vi(a¯) to ensure
incentive compatibility. The a-country may thus end up with a negative expected welfare.
Satisfying the participation constraint of the a-country calls for reducing the contribution
of this country. This makes the a¯ -country more eager to mimic the a -one, hardening
thereby its incentive constraint (11). Incentive compatibility at the country level is thus
easier to achieve if pˆ is distorted downwards and if, when countries have different
preferences for redistribution, the consumption of the poor agents within a a-country is
downward distorted below the second-best.
Let us characterize the optimal mechanism. Note that the IA’s problem becomes now:
ðTPÞSB : max
fpðÞ; xiðÞ;UiðÞ;ViðÞg
X2
i¼1
E
ai
ðViðaiÞÞ
subject to Eqs. (6), (7), (9), (11), (12), (14) and (15).
We show in an Appendix that this problem can be simplified to:
ðTPÞSB* : max
fpðÞ; xiðÞg
E
a
pðaÞ
X2
i¼1
E
h
ðS˜ðh; xiðh; aÞ; aiÞÞ
 !( )
subject to
Ea pðaÞ
X2
i¼1
E
h
ðS˜ðh; xiðh; aÞ; aiÞÞ
 !( )

X2
i¼1
mqDaDh E
ai
ðpða; aiÞ


vðxiðh; a; aiÞÞÞ

z0: ð18Þ
This constraint aggregates the ex post budget-balanced constraint (9), the relevant
(binding) incentive constraint (11) of the a¯-countries and the participation constraint (15)
of a a-country. Condition (18) simply means that the aggregate welfare over both countries
should cover the informational cost of inducing information revelation by the a¯-countries.
The impact of this constraint is akin to that of a budget-breaking constraint in Ramsey–
Boiteux models. As in those models, allocative distortions are needed to satisfy Eq. (18)
and the shadow cost of this constraint plays an important role in the characterization of
those distortions.
The optimal mechanism might be quite complex and involve distortions of both the
pricing rule and/or the decision to build or not the infrastructure. To obtain clear results
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assume that the fixed-cost F is large enough so that the following condition holds:
2q2 E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; a¯Þ; a¯ÞÞ þ 2qð1 qÞ E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; a¯Þ; a¯ÞÞ þ E
h
ðS˜ðh; xlðh; aÞ; aÞÞ
 
< 2mq2DaDhvðxlðh; aÞÞ; ð19Þ
where xl(h¯, a) = x*(h¯) and xl (h, a) is defined by:
h  mð1 aÞ
1 m Dh 
mqDa
ð1 mÞð1 qÞ Dh
 
vVðxlðh; aÞÞ ¼ c: ð20Þ
Eq. (19) strengthens condition (16) and describes cases where inefficiencies are large.
Indeed, there does not exist any modification of the second-best consumption x˜(h , a )
which, alone, could ensure that the feasibility condition (18) is satisfied. Playing on the
probability of building or not the project is absolutely needed.26
Proposition 4. Assume that countries can opt out of the mechanism if they do not get a
non-negative expected welfare and that condition (19) holds. The optimal mechanism is
characterized as follows.
	 The a-country gets zero expected welfare (its participation constraint (15) is binding).
	 The decision to build the infrastructure is distorted with the project being realized less
often than when countries’ preferences are common knowledge. In particular, when
countries are asymmetric, the probability of building the project is positive but always
less than one: p¯SB = p¯*= 1, pˆSBa[0, 1], pSB = p*= 0.
	 Consumptions in the a¯-countries are still constrained efficient; xSB(h¯, a¯, ai)= x*(h¯) and
xSB(u, a¯, a i) = x˜(u, a
¯
) for all a i.
	 There is an extra downward distortion of the consumption of the poor in the a-
countries: xSB(h¯, a, a¯) = x*(h¯) and xSB(h, a, a
¯
) < x˜(h, a). Denoting by k> 0, the shadow
cost of the feasibility constraint (18), we have:
h  mð1 aÞ
1 m Dh 
kmqDa
ð1þ kÞð1 mÞð1 qÞ Dh
 
vVðxSBðh; a; a¯ÞÞ ¼ c: ð21Þ
	 Pricing in a poor country depends on the shadow cost k and thus on the redistributive
concerns within the rich country which is the only partner with which the project is
realized.
We already noticed that the conflict between the incentive constraint of a a¯-country and
the participation constraint of a a-one is solved by moving to a policy which is no longer
constrained efficient. When countries have asymmetric preferences, the project is no26 When Eq. (19) does not hold but still Eq. (16) holds, we are in cases of intermediate inefficiencies where,
depending on the functional forms, a distortion on the decision to build or not the infrastructure may be needed.
To get sharper results, we omit these less interesting cases.
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random and requires to cancel the project with some positive probability.27,28
To solve this conflict, the IA must make the distribution of utilities within the a-country
less attractive to a a¯-country. In a a¯-country, inequality is less costly than in a a-one. By
mimicking a a-country, a a¯-one reduces its overall contribution but it also chooses a more
egalitarian distribution of utilities. When the IA offers to a a-country a pricing scheme
inducing a very egalitarian distribution of utilities, it reduces also the incentives of a a¯-
country to mimic a a-one. A more egalitarian distribution of utilities in the a-country is an
optimal response to the informational problem that the IA faces.
From Eq. (21), everything happens thus as if the a-country had now a positive stronger
virtual aversion to inequality a˜ defined as:
a˜ ¼ a  kqð1þ kÞð1 qÞ Da < a:
This modification of the redistributive concerns within the a-country captures how the
incentive problem between countries trickles down within the countries themselves.
Pricing within a a-country is distorted to limit consumption by the poor and make them
pay less for the infrastructure. In fact, by introducing a participation constraint at the
country level, one implicitly gives to the IA a redistributive concern and makes it averse to
inequality across countries. These concerns add up to the aversion to inequality within
countries themselves to justify more redistributive policies.
At a broader level, the fact that the nested information structure of our model leads to
extra distortions away from (constrained) efficiency bears some resemblance with some of
the results of the literature on hierarchical contracting.29 There, it is shown that taking
seriously into account the participation constraints of intermediate layers may increase
inefficiency when contracts at different tiers are chosen non-cooperatively. Nevertheless,
there remain several important differences with our model. Contrary to this literature, we
are concerned with the trade-off between efficiency and redistribution instead of that
between efficiency and rent extraction. Also, even though our information structure is
nested, the whole economy is ruled through a single mechanism which helps countries to
coordinate prices and not as a sequence of bilateral contracts chosen non-cooperatively by
the different tiers of the hierarchy.30
Interestingly, the consumption xSB(h, a a¯) is always strictly above xl(h, a) which is
obtained by setting k= +l into Eq. (21). This ranking captures again the fact that
distorting pricing is a useful tool to induce information revelation but it is not sufficient27 In the game theoretic model of Arce and Sandler (2002), the IA acts also as a mediator who enforces a
correlated equilibrium where randomness in the outcome improves cooperation. In our framework, that
randomness relaxes incentive constraints.
28 Of course, enforcing a random mechanism is a more difficult task than enforcing a deterministic contract
but the IA’s reputation may play a role in making credible the commitment to such a random outcome.
29 See Melumad et al. (1995), McAfee and McMillan (1995) and Faure-Grimaud et al. (2003) among others.
30 See nevertheless Section 6 for an extension where pricing is decided at the local level without coordination
between countries.
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if the project is sometimes canceled, distortions in consumption are not maximal.
Importantly, the dichotomy between the decision to build or not the infrastructure and
the pricing rules no longer holds when countries must voluntarily participate to the
mechanism. Both pricing and the decision to build or not the project are used altogether to
solve the incentive problem at the country level. A lower probability of building the
infrastructure when countries are asymmetric relaxes Eq. (18) and makes it less necessary
to distort consumption in a poor country. If the project is realized less often, the marginal
price paid by the poor for an extra unit of consumption can be reduced with respect to the
price that would be charged had the IA committed to always realize the project when the
countries have asymmetric preferences.
The shadow cost k of the feasibility constraint (18) plays a crucial role in linking
distortions on pricing and consumption and the distortion on the probability of realizing
the project. For instance, when condition (16) is almost an equality, i.e., for a fixed-cost
which is not too large.31 k is small, the probability pˆ of building the project in the case
of asymmetric preferences is close to one and the distortions in the distribution of
utilities within the country are weakened. Pricing in a poor country is almost kept
unchanged.6. Loss of control on pricing
We now investigate a less comprehensive contracting environment where the IA can no
longer control pricing and let governments choose freely the prices charged to consumers.
This choice can thus be viewed as a moral hazard variable not observable by the IA. The
economy is no longer ruled through a set of bilateral contracts which are cooperatively set
by the IA but by bilateral contractual relationships between and within countries which are
no longer as coordinated. There is clearly a loss of control associated to relinquishing
control rights on pricing to the national level. This section analyzes the consequences of
this loss of control.
First, note that, for any probability of making the project and the overall contribution
made by a country, consumptions reflect now only the preferences in this country, and the
optimal second-best profile of consumptions specific to each country x˜(h, ai) is always
implemented. Second, the only screening instruments available to the IA are now the
contributions and the probability of building the infrastructure. A mechanism in this
environment is of the form {p(aˆ); Ti(aˆ)}.
Let us first redefine the expected welfare in country Ci as:
ViðaiÞ E
ai
TiðaÞ þ pðaÞE
h
S˜ðh; x˜ðh; aiÞ; aiÞ þ F
2
  
: ð22Þ31 Of course, this fixed cost must be large enough to ensure that two a-countries would not always build the
project under complete information so that (H2) holds.
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according to its preferences only and that the corresponding consumptions are x˜(h, ai).
We can rewrite the countries’ incentive constraints as:
Viða¯ÞzViðaÞ þ E
ai
ðpða; aiÞÞ E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; a¯Þ; a¯Þ  E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; aÞ; aÞÞ
 
ð23Þ
and
ViðaÞzViða¯Þ  E
ai
ðpða¯; aiÞÞ E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; a¯Þ; a¯Þ  E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; aÞ; aÞÞ
 
: ð24Þ
Taking into account the countries’ participation constraints, the IA’s problem can now
be written as:
ðTPÞÞL : maxfpðÞ;ViðÞg
X2
i¼1
E
ai
ðViðaiÞÞ
subject to Eqs. (8), (14), (15), (22), (23) and (24).
Of course, constrained efficiency may still be achieved even with the participation
constraint (15) just as in the case where pricing can be fully controlled. To analyze more
interesting cases characterized by some distortions, let us assume that the following
condition holds:
2q2 E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; a¯Þ; a¯ÞÞ þ 2qð1 qÞ E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; a¯Þ; a¯ÞÞ þ E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; aÞ; aÞÞ
 
< 2q2 E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; a¯Þ; a¯ÞÞ  E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; aÞ; aÞÞ
 
: ð25Þ
Condition (25) is similar to Eq. (19) obtained when pricing can be fully controlled by
the IA. Again, (H1) and (H2) ensure that the decision to build or not the project is case-
sensitive and depends on the concerns for redistribution of both countries.
Proposition 5. Assume that governments in each country keep control of pricing and that
conditions (H1), (H2) and Eq. (25) hold. The optimal mechanism with voluntary
participation of the countries is characterized as follows.
	 The incentive constraint of a a¯-country (Eq. (23)) and the participation constraint of a
a-one (Eq. (15)) are both binding.
	 The decision to build the infrastructure is distorted with the project being realized less
often than when countries’ preferences are common knowledge. In particular, when
countries are asymmetric, the probability of building the project is positive but always
less than one: p¯L = 1, pˆLa[0,1] and pL= 0.
	 The constrained efficient levels of consumption x˜( h, ai ) are always chosen in both
countries.
	 By definition, the dichotomy between pricing and the decision to build or not the
infrastructure holds.
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consumption is always constrained efficient. The only remaining screening tool available
becomes the probability of making the project when countries are asymmetric, namely pˆ.
As a result, we expect greater distortions in the decision to realize the project when pricing
of the infrastructure is out of the IA’s control. Cancelling more often the project becomes
an imperfect substitute for the missing control on prices.
To prove this result, we have to compare two third-best policies and, as usual, this
exercise is difficult because of the endogeneity of the multiplier. However, the next
proposition confirms that the intuition above is true at least under some conditions.
Proposition 6. Assume that Dh is small enough, then pˆL < pˆ
SB.
Alternatively, the setting described in this section can be viewed as resulting from anexogenous political constraint that forces the IA to let countries exert their sovereignty in
choosing prices. Relinquishing these control rights may again lead to an inefficiently low
provision of the infrastructure if pricing in both countries are kept independent.7. An IA with redistributive concerns
So far, the IA was modeled as a benevolent maximizer of the sum of both countries’
expected welfares just in line with Myerson and Sattherwaite (1983) approach to modeling
a mediator in the bargaining process. The sole concern of this mediator was thus the
expected (constrained) efficiency of the outcome. This characterizes the most favorable
bargaining procedure from an ex ante viewpoint.
Let us now look at the optimal mechanism that would be chosen by an IA with a more
active role on the redistribution side. Since bargaining will be less efficient, such a
mediator with his own redistributive concerns could only be accepted by the countries if he
subsidizes somewhat the project by bringing his own funds.32 Redistribution can be
pursued at the aggregate level, i.e., between countries, or at the individuals level. Both
cases are analyzed below.
7.1. Redistribution across countries
We now assume that the IA wants to maximize the following weighted sum of the
aggregate welfare in both countries:
X2
i¼1
bqViða¯ÞÞ þ ð1 bqÞViðaÞ ¼
X2
i¼1
E
ai
ðViðaiÞÞ  qð1 bÞðViða¯Þ  ViðaÞÞ
 
where 0 < b < 1. This new objective function highlights the trade-off faced by the IA
between looking for a (constrained) efficient outcome which maximizes the sum of32 With that interpretation, the fixed cost F should be understood as net of this subsidy.
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incentive compatibility at the countries level requires.33
Still assuming that countries can exert their sovereign rights and opt out of the
mechanism if they wish so, the IA is constrained by the same budget-balanced, incentive
and participation constraints than in Section 5. After consolidation of these constraints, the
reduced form of the IA’s problem writes as:
ðTPÞRC* : maxfpðÞ; xiðÞgEa pðaÞ
X2
i¼1
E
h
ðS˜ðh; xiðh; aÞ; aiÞÞ
 !( )

X2
i¼1
mqð1 bÞDaDh E
ai
ðpða; aiÞvðxiðh; a; aiÞÞÞ
subject to Eq. (18).
Proposition 7. Assume that countries can opt out of the mechanism, that the IA has some
redistributive concerns between countries and that conditions (H1), (H2) and Eq. (19)
hold. The optimal mechanism is similar to that in Proposition 4. In particular, it
entails:
	 A distortion in the decision to build the infrastructure when countries have asymmetric
preferences: p¯RC = 1, pˆRCa[0,1], pRC= 0.
	 A downward distortion for the consumption of the poor in the a-country; xRC(h¯, a, a¯) =
x*(h¯) and xRC(u, a, a¯) < x˜(h, a) with
h  m
1 m ð1 aÞDh 
ðk þ 1 bÞmDa
ð1þ kÞð1 mÞð1 qÞ Dh
 
vVðxRCðh; a; a¯ÞÞ ¼ c ð26Þ
where k is the shadow cost of the feasibility constraint (18).
If the shadow cost k was the same for problems (TP)SB* and (TP)RC*, the
consumption would be more distorted when the IA has some redistributive concerns.
The intuition is straightforward. The distribution of welfare across countries is now
viewed as being directly costly and not, as in Section 5, only indirectly because of the
presence of the a-country’s participation constraint. This new direct reason for reducing
Vi(a¯) calls for extra downward distortions.
34 Far from helping in improving expected
welfare in the poor countries the redistributive concerns of the IA call for greater
downward distortions in consumption and a reinforced link between pricing in both
countries.33 This objective can be rationalized in the same way as what we did for the objective functions of the
governments themselves (see Appendix A for that case). By varying the reservation payoff of the poor countries,
one describes several possible values of b.
34 A more formal comparison is made difficult by the fact that the shadow cost changes between the two
problems and that computing explicitly those shadow costs is difficult as usual in second-best environments.
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Let us look at the case where the IA has some concerns for poverty at the individual
level and puts an extra exogenous positive weight l on the utility levels of the poor agents.
This reduced form can be rationalized by introducing explicitly a subsistence level (or
reservation payoff) for the poorest agents into the constraints of a benevolent mediator.35
Formally, the IA now maximizes:
X2
i¼1
E
ai
ViðaiÞ
 !
þ l
X2
i¼1
E
a
ðUiðh; aÞÞ
 !
where l>0. Because the rich agents’ incentive constraints within each country are binding,
we have:
E
ai
ðUiðh; ai; aiÞÞ ¼ ViðaiÞ  aimDh E
ai
ðpðaÞvðxðh; aÞÞÞ: ð27Þ
We can finally rewrite the IA’s objective function as:
E
ai
ViðaiÞ  ailm
1þ l Dh EaiðpðaÞvðxh; aÞÞÞ
 
:
Because l>0, the welfare inequality within countries is viewed as costly by the IA.
Following the same steps as before, the reduced form of the IA’s problem can be
written as:
ðTPÞRA* : maxfpðÞ; xiðÞgEa pðaÞ
X2
i¼1
E
h
ðS˜ðh; xiðh; aÞ; aiÞÞ  l
1þ l maiDhvðxiðh; aÞÞ
 !( !
subject to Eq. (18).
We need to describe a pair of conditions similar to (H1) and (H2) which ensure that the
project would be done under complete information on the preferences profile if and only if
at least one of the country is a rich one. Those conditions are:
E
h
S˜ h; x˜ h;
a¯
1þ l
 
;
a¯
1þ l
  
þ E
h
S˜ h; x˜ h;
a
1þ l
 
;
a
1þ l
  
> 0; ðH1VÞ
E
h
S˜ h; x˜ h;
a
1þ l
 
;
a
1þ l
  
< 0: ðH2VÞ35 Because of incentive compatibility within countries, the same subsistence level is also satisfied for the rich
agents.
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redistributive concerns and cares about poverty within countries and that conditions
(H1V), (H2V) and Eq. (19) hold. The optimal mechanism is similar to that in Proposition 4.
In particular, it entails:
	 A distortion in the decision to build the infrastructure when countries have asymmetric
preferences: p¯RA= 1, pˆRAa[0,1], pRA= 0.
	 Strong downward distortions for the consumption of the poor in both a a¯- and a a-
country if the project is realized:
h  m
1 m 1
a¯
1þ l
 
Dh
 
vVðxRAðh; a¯; a¯ÞÞ ¼ c ð28Þ
h  m
1 m 1
a
1þ l
 
Dh  kmqDað1þ kÞð1 mÞð1 qÞ Dh
 
vVðxRAðh; a; a¯ÞÞ ¼ c
ð29Þ
where k is the shadow cost of the feasibility constraint (18).
The IA’s concern for poverty limits the prices charged to the poor in both countries. The
bulk of the contribution is thus borne by the rich agents. This hardens their incentive
constraint and requires further distortions of the consumption of the poor to make their
allocation less attractive to the rich. As a result, there will be strong distortions on
consumptions even if both countries are rich.
Looking at the solution, everything happens as if, a priori, the preferences for
redistribution could be characterized by a new parameter b = (a/1 + l) < a and then an
analysis similar to that of Section 5 follows. The IA’s concerns for poverty trickles down
again to the local level. The external mechanism for public good provision puts enough
constraints on local governments to modify their preferences for redistribution and makes
them behave as being more averse to inequality than what they really are.8. Extensions and conclusion
In this paper, we have shown how asymmetric information may impede efficiency in
the provision of transnational projects. Optimal mechanisms may call for cancelling more
often the projects than when the preference profile for redistribution of the countries
involved is common knowledge. Consumption by the poor is also reduced for incentive
compatibility reasons and prices in both countries are linked.
Transnational projects have also an impact on the distribution of utilities within
countries. The governments’ concerns for redistribution might be exacerbated by the
external constraints imposed by the IA’s mechanism. The IA’s concerns for redistribution
either across or within countries spill over to the local level, reinforce the governments’
own concerns for redistribution, affects pricing and the decision to build or not the
infrastructure.
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instruments for enforcing the mechanism determines the size of the inefficiency. As the
IA has less control of the project (either because it cannot force acceptance by sovereign
countries or because it cannot control prices), inefficiency increases and the project is less
likely to be implemented. At a broad level, these results suggest that some form of
sovereignty loss is needed to facilitate the structural investments which are necessary for
growth. Otherwise, investments may be kept inefficiently low to preserve ex post
agreement of countries.
Various extensions of our framework would be worth to be undertaken.
8.1. Comparison with other forms of financing
A more complete analysis should compare the costs and benefits of various institutions
for accessing to those infrastructures. In this respect, it is striking that the very argument of
sovereignty loss that was used to criticize financing by private foreign investors comes
with a revenge in the case of an a priori more cooperative bargaining solution. More
generally, it would be worth to compare the outcome achieved with those collective
mechanisms with what is achieved when countries decide to get access to those infra-
structures by using foreign private investors. One important question from a policy point
of view is to know whether the cooperative solution discussed in this paper is subject to as
much renegotiation as the traditional devices. Even though no theory is yet available, some
comments can already been made. Indeed, it is well known from adverse selection models
that transaction costs of contracting under asymmetric information are lower when
bargaining powers are more equal than with asymmetric bargaining powers. The strong
bargaining position of foreign private financiers in contracting suggests therefore that there
exist then large costs of signing and renegotiating contracts that could be (at least partially)
avoided through joint effort by countries.
8.2. Political economy
Our approach so far has been mostly normative and an obvious extension would be to
deal more precisely with the political economy side of the model. Political economy
considerations could help to endogenize the preferences for redistribution at the local level.
An important issue that could be analyzed is the corruption of governments, a phenomenon
which is very likely to arise given the important financial stakes involved with transnational
projects. Politics could also help to understand the IA’s objective function if the latter was
modeled as a more active actor obeying to his own incentives and reputational concerns.
8.3. Voluntary contributions
In our framework, we gave to the IA a strong commitment ability by having it move
first and commit itself to a mechanism. This approach yields an upper bound on what can
be achieved through any bargaining mechanism between countries. An alternative and
weaker view of the IA would be to see it as simply collecting voluntary contributions.
Although there exists now a literature on voluntary contributions under asymmetric
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tions are made by countries and not by individuals. It would be worth to provide such an
extension and compare the equilibrium outcomes with that achieved under the more
centralized mechanism described in this paper.
8.4. Externalities and scale economies
The externality between countries was modeled in a rather crude way. In our model,
scale economies can only be achieved by building a common infrastructure. Other forms
of increasing returns could be considered. For instance, it may become at the margin easier
to provide consumption to new consumers as others are already served.37 Decreasing
marginal costs introduce some new features. Downward distortions in consumption must
be somewhat mitigated to keep low marginal costs. Inducing such distortions as screening
devices seems less useful than playing on the probabilities of building the project. One
may expect that the infrastructure should be less often built as increasing returns become
more important, whereas at the same time consumption should not bet distorted too much.
Network externality may also affect demand.38 The existence of such a transnational
network externality gives a new role to the IA who now proposes prices which make each
country internalize the impact of its own consumption choices on the other. Of course, this
requires that the IA can fully control those prices. In the absence of such a control, local
governments would choose prices non-cooperatively and this would lead to inefficient
consumption because of a (non-internalized) positive externality. However, to benefit from
the network externality, consumptions should not be too distorted. Again, the only
screening tool available to the IA remains then the probability of cancelling the project.
8.5. Local infrastructures
An alternative to the transnational project may be to build infrastructures of a lesser
scale in each country. The reservation payoff of each country is no longer zero and
depends explicitly on its preferences for redistribution. New issues in the design of the
collective agreement may appear. Ex post agreement between the countries may now
become harder and as a result one should expect the project to be less often realized. On
the other hand, one important lesson of adverse selection models with type-dependent
reservation payoffs is that those outside opportunities, when binding, tend to reduce
allocative inefficiencies and consumption should be kept close to the second-best.39
8.6. Global public goods
Even though we had in mind specific examples of transnational infrastructures for
developing countries in writing this paper, its lessons may have also some value to39 See Laffont and Martimort (2002, Chap. 3).
36 See Menezes et al. (2001), Laussel and Palfrey (2003) and Martimort and Moreira (2003) for instance.
37 A typical example could be irrigation.
38 For instance, in the case of a telecommunications network, our assumption that the benefits of consuming
in one country do not depend on the consumption in another nearby country may seem unrealistic.
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warming, disease prevention, trade agreements, etc.
We hope to investigate some of the specific issues raised by those public goods in
further research.Acknowledgements
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Jacques Laffont passed away. We will miss him.Appendix A. Endogenizing government’s preferences and asymmetric information
Let us suppose that pricing is used to cover a random deficit j˜a{j, j¯} with respective
probabilities q and 1 q and j¯>j. We suppose that the government is benevolent and
maximizes the sum of utilities of the different types of agents subject to the agents’
incentive and participation constraints that we will normalize at some exogenous level U0.
Focusing (as usual) only on the rich agent’s incentive constraint and the poor agent’s
participation one, the government’s problem can be written as:
max
fxðÞ;UðÞg
mUðh¯Þ þ ð1 mÞUðhÞ:
subject to
Uðh¯Þ  UðhÞzDhvðxðhÞÞ; ðA:1Þ
UðhÞzU0; ðA:2Þ
and
mUðh¯Þ þ ð1 mÞUðhÞ þ jVmðh¯vðxðh¯ÞÞ  cxðh¯ÞÞ þ ð1 mÞðhvðxðhÞÞ  cxðhÞÞ;
ðA:3Þ
where the latter constraint is the budget constraint of the state when the deficit is j. Of
course, this constraint is binding at the optimum.
From Eqs. (A.1) and (A.2), Eq. (A.3) implies:
mðh¯vðxðh¯ÞÞ  cxðh¯ÞÞ þ ð1 mÞðhvðxðhÞÞ  cxðhÞÞzj þ mDhvðxðhÞÞ þ U0: ðA:4Þ
When j is large enough (but not too large so that the constrained set remains non-empty),
this constraint is clearly no longer satisfied by the first-best optimal levels of consumptions
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(A.2) are also binding). We can rewrite the government’s problem as
max
fxðÞg
mðh¯vðxðh¯ÞÞ  cxðh¯ÞÞ þ ð1 mÞðhvÞðxðhÞÞ  cxðhÞÞ
subject to Eq. (A.4).
Denoting by l(j) the positive multiplier of Eq. (A.4), the government maximizes
ð1 mÞðhvðxðhÞÞ  cxðhÞÞ þ mðh¯vðxðh¯ÞÞ  cxðh¯ÞÞ  mlðjÞ
1þ lðjÞ DhvðxðhÞÞ
for some l(j)>0, where l(j) is given by the slackness condition. Of course, l(j) is
increasing in j. Denoting 1– a¯=l(j¯)/(1 + l(j)) and 1–a=l(j)/(1 + l(j)), we observe that
everything happens as if the government maximizes an objective function of the type
amU(h¯)+(1 am)U(h ). Private information on the parameter a can thus be viewed as a
reduced form for private information on the shock j hitting the budget constraint of the state.
Appendix B. (Transformation of (TP)FB into (TP)FB* and Proof of Proposition 1
First, we rewrite the objective function of the IA which becomes:
X2
i¼1
mUiðh¯; aÞ þ ð1 mÞUiðh; aÞ  mð1 aiÞðUiðh¯; aÞ  Uiðh; aÞÞ
 
for a given preferences profile a=(a1,a2). Clearly, this shows that Eq. (A.4) must be
binding at the optimum and we get thus:
X2
i¼1
V˜iðaÞ ¼ pðaÞ
X2
i¼1
E
h
ðSðh; xiðh; aÞÞÞ
( )

X2
i¼1
mð1 aiÞðUiðh¯; aÞ  Uiðh; aÞÞÞ:
ðA:5Þ
Since ai < 1, the second term on the right-hand side of Eq. (A.5) is minimized when Eq.
(6) is binding. Note then that Eq. (7) is slack as soon as xi(h, a) < xi (h¯, a), a monotonicity
condition that will be checked ex post.
Inserting Eq. (6) binding into Eq. (A.5) yields the maximand of (TP)FB*, namely:
pðaÞ
X2
i¼1
E
h
ðS˜ðh; xiðh; aÞ; aiÞÞ
( )
:
The second-best consumptions x˜(h, ai) maximize this expression. Of course, x˜(h, ai)
<x*(h¯) and Eq. (6) binding implies that Eq. (7) is slack.
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x˜(h, a) and the fact that the government in the poor country is more averse to inequality
that in the rich country, x˜(h, a) < x˜(h, a¯). Finally, E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; a¯Þ; a¯ÞÞ > E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; aÞ; aÞÞ.
Hence, assumption (H1) implies also that p¯*=1. 5
Appendix C. Transformation of (TP)0 into (TP)0* and Proof of Proposition 2
First, we observe that:
ViðaiÞ ¼ E
ai
E
h
ðUiðh; aÞÞ  mð1 aiÞðUiðh¯; aÞ  Uiðh; aÞÞ
 
¼ E
a1
pðaÞ E
h
ðSðh; xðh; aÞÞÞ þ F
2
 
 mð1 aiÞðUiðh¯; aÞ  Uiðh; aÞÞ
 
 E
ai
ðTiðaÞÞ:
For a symmetric mechanism, E
ai
ðTiða¯; aiÞ¼qT¯ þ ð1 qÞTˆ1 and E
ai
ðTiða; aiÞ¼qTˆ2 þ
ð1 qÞT . Hence, still using the symmetry of the mechanism, we have:
X2
i¼1
E
ai
ðViðaiÞÞ ¼ E
a
pðaÞ
X2
i¼1
E
h
ðSðh; xiðh; aÞÞÞ
 !
þ F
 ! !

X2
i¼1
mð1 aiÞðUiðh¯; aÞ  Uiðh; aÞÞ  E
a
X2
i¼1
TiðaÞ
 !
:
Maximization of this expression subject to the ex post budget constraints (8) is
obtained when all such constraints are binding. Moreover, as in the Proof of
Proposition 1 the right-hand side above is maximized when Eq. (6) is binding, i.e.,
Uiðh¯; aÞ  Uiðh; aÞ ¼ pðaÞDhvðxiðh; aÞÞ; for all iaf1; 2g:
Again, the fact that xi(h, a) < xi(h¯, a) for the solution ensures that Eq. (7) is then
slack.
Gathering all those facts, we obtain:
X2
i¼1
E
ai
ðViðaiÞÞ ¼ E
a
pðaÞ
X2
i¼1
E
h
ðS˜ðh; xiðh; aÞ; aiÞÞ
 !( )
; ðA:6Þ
i.e., the maximand of (TP0)* with the incentive constraints of both countries (Eqs. (11)
and (12)). There exists a whole range of solutions to this problem which are all
characterized by the same consumptions and the same aggregate welfare. We will
focus on the symmetric ones and thus omit indices. This allows us a clear
characterization of the incentive compatible pairs (V(a¯),V(a)). There is still a whole
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the incentive constraints (11) and (12).
Since Eq. (A.6) holds as an equality, defining V(a) defines also V(a¯). All possible
values of V(a) describe the interval [Vm(a), VM(a)] where:
VmðaÞ ¼ A
2
 mqDaDhvðx˜ðh; a¯ÞÞ;
VMðaÞ ¼ A
2
 mq2DaDhvðx˜ðh; aÞÞ;
and A is the right-hand side of Eq. (A.6) computed for the constrained efficient
probabilities p¯*= pˆ*= 1, p*= 0 and the second-best consumptions x˜(h, a). We have
thus:
A ¼ 2q2 E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; a¯Þ; a¯ÞÞ þ 2qð1 qÞ E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; a¯Þ; a¯ÞÞ þ E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; aÞ; aÞÞ
 
:
Since q < 1 and x˜(h, a) < x˜(h, a¯), we have indeed VM(a) >Vm(a). For any V(a) in
[Vm(a ), VM(a )] and the corresponding value of V(a¯ ) obtained when Eq. (A.6) is
binding, we can find the values of the symmetric transfers (T¯, Tˆ1, Tˆ2, T ), which
implement these utility levels as solutions to the following system:
V ðaÞ ¼ qpˆ* E
h
ðS˜ðh; xSBðh; a; a¯ÞÞÞ þ F
2
 
 ðqTˆ2 þ ð1 qÞTÞ ðA:7Þ
V ða¯Þ ¼ qp¯* E
h
ðS˜ðh; xSBðh; a¯; a¯ÞÞÞ þ F
2
 
þ ð1 qÞpˆ* E
h
ðS˜ðh; xSBðh; a¯; aÞÞÞ þ F
2
 
 ðqT¯ þ ð1 qÞTˆ1Þ ðA:8Þ
2T¯ ¼ p¯*F; ðA:9Þ
Tˆ1 þ Tˆ2 ¼ pˆ*F; ðA:10Þ
2T ¼ p*F; ðA:11Þ
where p¯*= pˆ*= 1 and p*= 0.
Note that Eqs. (A.9) and (A.11) yield immediately T¯=F/2 and T = 0 meaning that
no transfer is paid when the project is not done. Finally, (Tˆ1, Tˆ2) is immediately
obtained as a solution to Eqs. (A.7) and (A.10). 5
Appendix D. Proof of Proposition 3
The same decision rule and consumptions as in Proposition 2 can no longer be obtained
when the preferences for redistribution are unknown if VM(a) < 0. Writing this condition
yields Eq. (16). 5
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Since Eq. (16) holds, Eq. (17) is not satisfied by the solution obtained when the
preferences profile a=(a1,a2) is common knowledge. Hence, we should look for a
solution of (TP)SB such that Eqs. (11) and (15) (and thus Eq. (18)) will be binding.
The fact that Eqs. (11) and (15) are satisfied implies (for a positive x(h, a, a¯)) that
Eq. (14) holds strictly, so that this constraint can be omitted in the optimization
below.
Let us omit also the incentive constraint (12) (which can be checked ex post). Then, we
can rewrite (TP)SB in a more compact way as:
ðTPÞSB : max
fpðÞ; xiðÞ;ViðÞg
E
a
pðaÞ
X2
i¼1
E
h
ðSðh; xiðh; aÞ; aiÞÞ
 !(

X2
i¼1
mð1 aiÞðUiðh¯; aÞ  Uiðh; aÞÞ
)
;
subject to (Eqs. (6), (7), (11) and (15) and
X2
i¼1
E
ai
ðViðaiÞÞ ¼ E
a
pðaÞ
X2
i¼1
E
h
ðSðh; xiðh; aÞ; aiÞÞ
 !(

X2
i¼1
mð1 aiÞðUiðh¯; aÞ  Uiðh; aÞÞ
)
: ðA:12Þ
Using Eqs. (11) and (15), we get
E
a
pðaÞ
X2
i¼1
E
h
ðSðh; xiðh; aÞ; aiÞÞ
 !

X2
i¼1
mð1 aiÞðUiðh¯; aÞ  Uiðh; aÞÞ
( )
¼
X2
i¼1
E
ai
ðViðaiÞÞz
X2
i¼1
mqDa E
ai
ðUiðh¯; a; aiÞ  Uiðh; a; aiÞÞ: ðA:13Þ
Optimizing first with respect to Ui(S), Eq. (6) is binding to increase the maximand in
(TP)SBVand relax constraint Eq. (A.13). Eq. (7) is slack as it can be checked ex post.
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maximand of (TP)SBV, we get Eq. (18) and the expression of the maximand of IA’s
problem as (TP)SB*.
Let us denote by k the positive multiplier of Eq. (18) into (TP)SB*. The Lagrangean is:
E
a
ð1þ kÞpðaÞ
X2
i¼1
E
h
ðS˜ðh; xiðh; aÞ; aiÞÞ
 !( )

X2
i¼1
kmqDaDh E
ai
ðvðxiðh; a; aiÞÞÞ:
Optimizing with respect to xi(S) yields a symmetric solution such that
	 For a rich country,
h¯vVðxSBðh¯; a¯; aiÞÞ ¼ c; bai
and so xSB(h¯, a¯, a i) = x*(h¯);
h  mð1 a¯Þ
1 m Dh
 
v VðxSBðh; a¯; aiÞÞ ¼ c; bai
and so xSB(h, a¯, a i) = x˜(h, a¯);
	 For a poor country,
h¯vVðxSBðh¯; a; aiÞÞ ¼ c; bai
and so xSB(h¯, a, a i) = x*(h¯);
h  mð1 aÞ
1 m Dh 
kqmDa
ð1þ kÞð1 qÞð1 mÞ Dh
 
vVðxSBðh; a; aiÞÞ ¼ c; bai
and so xSB(h, a, a i) < x˜(h, a) since k>0.
Let us now optimize with respect to p¯, pˆ and p. We obtain:
p¯SB ¼ 1Z2ð1þ kÞq2 E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; a¯Þ; a¯ÞÞ > 0 ðA:14Þ
which holds from (H1),
pˆSBa½0; 1Z2ð1þ kÞqð1 qÞ E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; a¯; a¯ÞÞ þ E
h
ðS˜ðh; xSBðh; a; a¯Þ; aÞÞ
 
¼ 2kq2mDaDhvðxSBðh; a; a¯ÞÞ; ðA:15Þ
pSB ¼ 0Z2ð1þ kÞð1 qÞ2 E
h
ðS˜ðh; xSBðh; a; aÞ; aÞÞ
< 2kqð1 qÞmDaDhvðxSBðh; a; aÞÞ: ðA:16Þ
J.-J. Laffont, D. Martimort / Journal of Public Economics 89 (2005) 159–196 191This latter inequality holds since xSB(h, a, a) < x˜(h, a) implies that E
h
ðS˜ðh; xSBðh; a; aÞ;
aÞÞ < E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; aÞ; aÞÞ < 0 from condition (H2).
From Eq. (18) binding, and taking also into account that p¯SB = 1 and pSB = 0, we get that
pˆSB, if it belongs to [0,1], is the solution to the following equation:
pˆSBð1 qÞ E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; a¯Þ; a¯ÞÞ þ E
h
ðS˜ðh; xSBðh; a; a¯Þ; aÞÞ
 
þ q E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; a¯Þ; a¯ÞÞ
¼ qmpˆSBDaDhvðxSBðh; a; a¯ÞÞ: ðA:17Þ
Using Eqs. (A.15) and (A.17), we obtain:
pˆSB
m
1þ k DaDhvðx
SBðh; a; a¯ÞÞ ¼ E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; a¯Þ; a¯ÞÞ: ðA:18Þ
The right-hand side is positive by condition (H1). Hence, pˆSB>0. Let us now show that
pˆSB < 1 is necessary when condition (19) holds. Observe that xl(h, a) defined by Eq. (20)
maximizes  qmDaDhm(x)+(1 q) (1 m)S˜(h, x, a). Therefore, even the strongest possible
distortion on x(h , a , a¯ ) makes it impossible to satisfy Eq. (18). A distortion of pˆ is
necessary.
Finally, to find the values of the transfers (T¯, Tˆ1, Tˆ2, T) one can proceed as in the Proof of
Proposition 3. Note that there is no freedom in the choice of V(a) which is always zero. 5
Appendix F. Proof of Proposition 5
When (H1) and (H2) hold, the optimal policy when the preferences profile a=(a1, a2) is
common knowledge is thus p¯*= pˆ*= 1, p*= 0.
We now transform (TP)L into (TP)L* below:
ðTPÞL* : maxfpðÞgEa pðaÞ Eh
X2
i¼1
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; aiÞ; aiÞ
 ! !( )
;
subject to
E
a
pðaÞ E
h
X2
i¼1
S˜ðh; x˜ðh; aiÞ; ai
 ! !( )

X2
i¼1
q E
ai
ðpða; aiÞÞ E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; a¯Þ; a¯ÞÞ

E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; aÞ; aÞÞ
!
z0: ðA:19Þ
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multiplier of Eq. (A.19) and optimizing the corresponding Lagrangean with respect to p¯, pˆ
and p within [0,1] yields:
p¯L ¼ 1Z2ð1þ kLÞq2 E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; a¯Þa¯ÞÞ > 0; ðA:20Þ
pˆLa½0; 1Z2ð1þ kLÞqð1 qÞ E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; a¯Þ; a¯ÞÞ þ E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; aÞ; aÞÞ
 
¼ 2kLq2 E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; a¯Þ; a¯ÞÞ  E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; aÞ; aÞÞ
 
; ðA:21Þ
p
L
¼ 0Z2ð1þ kLÞð1 qÞ2 E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; aÞ; aÞÞ
< 2kLqð1 qÞ E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; a¯Þ; a¯ÞÞ  E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; aÞ; aÞÞ
 
ðA:22Þ
Of course, p¯*= 1 and p*= 0 imply that Eqs. (A.20) and (A.22) both hold. Inserting p¯L= 1,
pL= 0 and Eq. (A.21) into Eq. (A.19) binding yields:
E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; a¯Þ; a¯ÞÞ ¼ pˆL
1þ kL Eh ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; a¯Þ; a¯ÞÞ  Eh ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; aÞ; aÞÞ
 
; ðA:23Þ
and thus pˆL>0.
Using Eq. (A.19) binding, we can derive pˆL explicitly as:
pˆL ¼ qEðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; a¯Þ; a¯ÞÞ
q E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; a¯Þ; a¯ÞÞ  E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; aÞ; aÞÞ
 
 ð1 qÞ E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; a¯Þ; a¯ÞÞ þ E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; aÞ; aÞÞ
 
Finally pˆL < 1 when condition (25) holds. 5Appendix G. Proof of Proposition 6
We derive from the Proof of Proposition 4 (Eq. (A.15)) that k is given by the following
expression:
k
1þ k ¼
ð1 qÞ E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; a¯Þ; a¯ÞÞ þ E
h
ðS˜ðh; xSBðh; a; a¯Þ; aÞÞ
 
qmDaDhvðxSBðh; a; a¯ÞÞ :
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maximizes S˜ (h, x, a), the factor in the numerator above differs of E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; a¯Þ; a¯ÞÞ þ E
hðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; aÞ; aÞÞby terms of order Dh2. Therefore, we have up to terms of order Dh2 on the
right-hand side belowkDh
1þ k ¼
ð1 qÞ E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; a¯Þ; a¯ÞÞ þ E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; aÞ; aÞÞ
 
qmDavðx˜ðh; aÞÞ 1
vVðx˜ðh; aÞÞDx
vðx˜ðh; aÞÞ
 where Dx = xSB(h, a, a¯) x˜(h, a) < 0.
Similarly, we get from the Proof of Proposition 5 that the multiplier kL is given by
kL
1þ kL ¼
ð1 qÞ E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; a¯Þ; a¯ÞÞ þ E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; aÞ; aÞÞ
 
q E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; a¯Þ; a¯ÞÞ  E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; aÞ; aÞÞ
  :
We thus observe that:
k
1þ kz
kL
1þ kL
E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; a¯Þ; a¯ÞÞ  E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; aÞ; aÞÞ
mDaDhvðx˜ðh; aÞ
0
@
1
A:
The bracketed term in the right-hand side above is greater than one since we have
E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; a¯Þ; a¯ÞÞ  E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; aÞ; aÞÞ  mDaDhvðx˜ðh; aÞÞ
¼ ð1 mÞðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; a¯Þ; a¯ÞÞ  S˜ðh; x˜ðh; aÞ; a¯ÞÞ > 0
by definition of x˜(h, a¯). Finally, we get that k>kL.
Let us turn to the expressions of pˆSB and pˆL. We have the following approximations (up
to terms of order Dh2)
pˆSB ¼
ð1þ kÞE
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; a¯Þ; a¯ÞÞ
mDhDavðx˜ðh; aÞÞ ;
and
pˆL ¼
ð1þ kLÞE
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; h¯Þ; h¯ÞÞ
E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; a¯Þ; a¯ÞÞ  E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; aÞ; aÞÞ
  :
Since kL < k and E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; a¯Þ; a¯ÞÞ  E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; aÞ; aÞÞ > mDhDavðx˜ðh; aÞÞ , we
get pˆL < pˆ
SB. 5
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The consolidation of incentive, budget-balanced and participation constraints into Eq.
(18) is the same as before and is thus omitted. When b < 1, the a¯ -country incentive
constraint is binding. This leads to the maximand of (TP)RC*. Optimizing the Lagrangean
and proceeding exactly as in the Proof of Proposition 4 yields the consumption distortions
in the text, whereas probabilities of building the project are given by:
p¯RC ¼ 1Z2ð1þ kÞq2 E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; a¯Þ; a¯ÞÞ > 0; ðA:24Þ
which holds from (H1).
pˆRCa½0; 1Z2ð1þ kÞqð1 qÞ E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; a¯Þ; a¯ÞÞ þ E
h
ðS˜ðh; xRCðh; a; a¯Þ; aÞÞ
 
¼ 2ðk þ 1 bÞq2mDaDhvðxRCðh; a; a¯ÞÞ; ðA:25Þ
p
RC
¼ 0Z2ð1þ kÞð1 qÞ2 E
h
ðS˜ðh; xRCðh; a; aÞ; aÞÞ
< 2ðk þ 1 bÞqð1 qÞmDaDhvðxRCðh; a; aÞÞ: ðA:26Þ
This latter inequality holds from condition (H2).. From Eq. (18) binding, and taking
also into account that p¯RC = 1 and pRC = 0, we get that pˆ
SB, if it belongs to [0,1], is the
solution to the following equation:
pˆRCð1 qÞ E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; a¯Þ; a¯ÞÞ þ E
h
ðS˜ðh; xRCðh; a; a¯Þ; aÞÞ
 
þ q E
h
ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; a¯Þ; a¯ÞÞ
¼ qmpˆRCDaDhvðxRCða; a¯ÞÞ:
Using Eqs. (A.25) and (A.27), we obtain:
pˆRC
mb
1þ k DaDhvðxRCðh; a; a¯ÞÞ ¼ Eh ðS˜ðh; x˜ðh; a¯Þ; a¯ÞÞ: ðA:28Þ
The right-hand side is positive by condition (H1). Hence, pˆRC>0. As in the Proof of
Proposition 4, one can show that pˆRC < 1 is necessary when condition (19) holds. 5Appendix I. Proof of Proposition 8
The consolidation of incentive, budget-balanced and participation constraints into Eq.
(18) is the same as before and is thus omitted. When Eq. (19) holds, the a¯ -country
incentive constraint is binding. This leads to the maximand of (TP)RA*. Optimizing the
Lagrangean and proceeding exactly as in the Proof of Proposition 4 with the new
conditions (H1V) and (H2V) yields the probabilities and consumptions in the text. 5
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